The historic United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance held in early September 2001 was unfortunately obscured by the tragic events of September 11. Nonetheless, the event reflects global recognition of problems of racial, ethnic and cultural discrimination, oppression and exploitation. The following analysis, inspired by participation in collaborative international research presented to the Conference, suggests that economic discrimination may be usefully seen in terms of rents and rent-seeking. By successfully discriminating against a particular group, employers or consumers succeed in extracting rents from the group discriminate against. However, such rents are different in nature.
Discriminated employees (e.g. Blacks) receive lower remuneration or inferior terms of employment. Successful discrimination allows employers to use their availability to extract additional 'producer surplus' by conceding lower ('intermediate'-level) wages or employment conditions to ostensibly privileged employees (e.g. Whites), than might be the case in the absence of discrimination. Even if there is an eventual equalization of wage rates or employment conditions between the group discriminated against and the privileged group, a 'producer surplus' from the poorer wages or employment conditions may well persist owing to the 'stickiness' of wages in both directions.
Vendors who are discriminated against are obliged to offer their products and services at lower prices than might otherwise be the case. Consumers may thus enjoy a 'consumer surplus' --than might otherwise be the case --at the expense of vendors. Of course, there may well be many countervailing tendencies which may offset this. The net effect depends very much on the aggregate outcome of these various countervailing tendencies.
The very existence of discrimination is yet another reminder of the variegated persistence of imperfect competition in contemporary economies, though of course, there are many other factors contributing to imperfect competition. With imperfect competition, what economists refer to as rents have been a 'fact of life' in most contemporary economies. Rents are sometimes also referred to as 'super-profits' or 'excess profits', i.e. over and above a notional 'normal rate of profit'. For more classically inclined economists, rents are part of the surplus.
Accumulation and growth can be understood in terms of how this surplus is deployed. The proposed analysis of rents and rent-seeking allows one to think of how the surplus might be deployed to enhance growth, structural transformation and redistribution. One can therefore think of how different deployment of the surplus may contribute to one or more of these objectives. Certain types of surplus deployment may simultaneously contribute to two or even all three objectives, while others may enhance one or two at the expense of the other objective(s).
Rents may be understood as factor incomes in excess of their opportunity incomes (Khan and Jomo 2001) . For many economists, rents are not supposed to exist in the long run as resources will be reallocated so that factor incomes from different activities will be equal. Rents are therefore presumed to persist because they are maintained by interventions in the market.
Rent-seeking seeks to capture such rents, by maintaining or reallocating existing rents, or even by creating and capturing new ones. Rent-seeking activities thus impose avoidable costs involving resource transfers, or alternatively, resource use on socially unnecessary and unproductive activities, which are deemed socially wasteful. In the former case, the resources are merely transferred, but not lost to the economy; in the latter case, the resources are dissipated. Rent-seeking is also deemed economically wasteful because of the high costs of rent-seekers' attempts to change the structure of rights, or regime of claims (to rents), by establishing new claims or rights. Khan (2001a Khan ( , 2001b has distinguished between value-creating and valuereducing rights as alternative possible outcomes of rent-seeking. In other words, the outcome of rent-seeking may well be a set of rights, or a claim (to rents) regime, that is either net value-enhancing, or net value-decreasing, or even neutral in terms of its effects on net value creation. As shown in Figure 1 , the net effect of rent-seeking depends on both the direct effect of withdrawing inputs from production as well as on the efficiency implications of the rights created, both in terms of the inputs as well as the outputs involved.
As Figure 2 shows, rent-seeking affects resource allocation, both in terms of resource availability as well as deployment. Regardless of their origin, resources may be allocated to either rent-seeking activity or to productive investments. Both, in turn, give rise to incomes or economic resources that may be available, to varying degrees, for the next round of resource allocation. Thus, as with productive investments, the consequences of rent-seeking -in terms of the distribution of rents -would affect resource allocation, which would, in turn, affect the deployment of available economic resources, including rents.
While it seems likely that rents secured through rent-seeking are more likely to be deployed in further rent-seeking, there is no compelling reason that this should necessarily be the case. The converse would also be true. Profits secured from productive investments may well be deployed for rent-seeking purposes, especially if the likely rate of return to such investments is higher or more secure. In many real-world situations, however, the choice to investors is not so stark. Investors are often obliged to deploy resources for both purposes simultaneously, e.g. to secure permission to produce for the protected domestic market, or to qualify for a certain export or technology development incentive such as a tax exemption.
Hence, it is important to consider the creation of efficient rent-seeking rights in relation to the origins, nature and distribution of rents. In particular, following Olson's distinction between growth and distribution coalitions, one might distinguish between 'developmental' and 'redistributive' rents, their respective impacts on the economy as well as the relationship between the two (Jomo & Gomez 2001) . Developmental rents were defined to include those created and distributed to encourage growth and structural transformation, including post-colonial diversification of the economy, industrialization as well as technological development.
Of course, the very creation and allocation of rents has distributive (rent-seeking rights) consequences, but the main redistributive rents discussed tended to be those popularly considered to be 'political', mainly because they are explicitly redistributive, although there are other redistributive rents in the economy as well. The changing political settlement constantly reshapes the rent-seeking regime. While inertia undoubtedly also influences this regime, major changes in economic policy are largely attributable to political changes, including international influences. Now that rents are no longer simply equated with waste or corruption, as has been common in popular political economy discourse since the eighties, it is tempting to see developmental rents as 'value-enhancing' and redistributive rents as 'value-reducing'.
However, regardless of the nature of the rent, if rent-seeking costs are relatively high, it is less likely to be conducive to the efficient creation of rights, with the net outcome more likely to be value-decreasing. Conversely, if access to rents involves minimal rentseeking costs, this is conducive to the efficient creation of rights, with the net outcome less likely to be value-decreasing. Hence, rent-seeking costs may be relatively high or low, depending on the manner access to the right is structured. And if rent-seeking costs are kept low, rent-seeking is less likely to be value-decreasing.
Hence, while rent-seeking transfers are undoubtedly a cost to the rent-seeker, they do not necessarily constitute social waste in an economic sense, in so far as such a transfer does not dissipate the economic resource being transferred. Of course, if such a transfer is illicit, the transferee may well choose to hide it by transferring and retaining the rent abroad, in which case it may no longer be available as an investment resource within the national economy. Expenses on rent-seeking activities are dissipated and thus constitute a social waste, and are therefore no longer available to the national economy.
Hence, the social implications of these two types of rent-seeking costs are quite different from an economic resource perspective.
But the analysis is still partial, in so far as attention is confined to the input side.
But as Khan emphasizes, addressing rent-seeking costs as well as associated waste due to dissipation on the input side begs the question of the nature of the rights being sought or created. On the output side, potentially value-enhancing rights may not be efficiently structured so that little value enhancement is actually achieved. In Malaysia, this seems to have been the fate of many import-substituting industries that emerged behind protective trade barriers, but never developed the industrial capabilities to become internationally competitive.
However, the economic consequences of ethnic discrimination are even more complicated. Different aspects of Malaysia's New Economic Policy (NEP) ethnic affirmative action program since the 1970s have had varied consequences. Improved provision of public health facilities and better access to education due to positive discrimination has undoubtedly contributed to more rapid economic growth and development. Hence, certain redistributive rights, e.g. involving human resource development or production credit to the poor, may be significantly value-enhancing, even if not envisaged as such. On the other hand, economic resources and regulation for the privileged ethnic elite have often gone to waste and otherwise retarded economic growth.
More problematic is the estimation of the social and political stability as well as foregone economic options attributable to such affirmative action programs.
Khan has listed conditions that facilitate the creation of efficient rights according to the type and allocation of rent-seeking inputs. If transfers compensate all losers due to the creation of new value-enhancing rights, his only condition is ensuring low political transaction costs for organizing the transfers. However, if not all losers are fully compensated by the transfer of inputs into rent-seeking, five other conditions become necessary: 1) state officials are rational and learn from their mistakes, i.e. it is not necessary that officials always get policies right, but they must have the ability to correct themselves.
2) the preferences of state officials should reflect those of society, i.e. not be socially perverse.
3) the state is not fragmented into various competing agencies so that state officials can benefit from value addition. 4) state officials must be potentially able to collect transfers from all agents and sectors so that they will create value-maximizing rights -rather than other rights. 5) there should be no political constraints on the creation of value-enhancing rights.
According to Khan, the last two essentially political conditions are rarely mentioned in the literature, but are likely to be the most constraining in practice. He also identifies an additional condition necessary for the creation of value-enhancing rights when the inputs are deployed for persuading activities (e.g. lobbying), which may be more relevant in advanced industrial democracies. In such circumstances, those demanding value-enhancing rights must also be better at organizing effective lobbying.
In less democratic, transparent or corporatist contexts, there are likely to be few if any instances of all losers (due to the creation of certain value-enhancing rights) being adequately compensated for their losses. However, at least some of the other conditions for the efficient creation of rights are more likely to obtain: 1) While official decision-makers are often criticized for poor decision-making, they have often demonstrated a significant ability to correct themselves as well as to improve policies.
2) By and large, official policy-making is likely to reflect social preferences, especially those of ethnic majorities or other politically significant demographic communities.
While thus enjoying some social support and legitimacy, the political and bureaucratic leadership are often able to exercise discretion to further such interests, including their own, if these can be effectively disguised or portrayed as in the interests of politically influential constituencies.
3) Centralization of power or devolution of control over economic resources, e.g. over fiscal resources, can often be decisive in initiating and sustaining such redistributive initiatives. 4) Conditions for the efficient creation of value-maximizing rights have been difficult to achieve.
5) The concentration of power in the hands of a sympathetic executive can reduce the political constraints on the creation of value-enhancing rights, though the growing influence of rent-seeking business interests on the executive has probably had the opposite effect.
One can go on to identify causal variables which help explain the efficiency --or otherwise --of rights created through rent-seeking, namely political institutions, ideology and cognition, collective action, and political constraints. Political constraints on the creation of value-enhancing rights have been reduced by these advantages, with such rights emerging from time to time, though often in coexistence with value-reducing rights.
Concluding Remarks
Hence, it is useful to think of positive discrimination or affirmative action or preferential measures in terms of rents and rent-seeking. Specific policy measures or institutional measures may simultaneously contribute to two or even all three objectives -of growth, structural transformation and redistribution --while others may enhance one or two objective(s) at the expense of the other objective(s). Only careful analysis can determine the net outcome of particular policy or institutional initiatives.
The preceding analysis suggests that the dynamic welfare implications of rent-seeking are more usefully understood by viewing rent-seeking as involving inputs as well as outputs, or costs as well as consequences. The proposed framework then suggests that under certain conditions, the benefits from particular policy or institutional innovations may well exceed the costs. The challenge then is to identify the terms, conditions and circumstances for maximizing the net benefits, which may not necessarily involve minimizing or eliminating rent-seeking costs or social waste altogether.
Recognizing the preceding is not tantamount to a blanket endorsement of all state interventions, or of all positive discrimination measures. Rather, it offers a different analytical framework for understanding ('negative') discrimination and its likely consequences, as well as the likely consequences of different policy or institutional initiatives intended to redress discrimination, oppression and explanation.
